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Andrew N's avatar

What a marvellous enlightening interview.

I like how you highlighted,

“For the wise men of old the cardinal problem had been how to conform the soul to reality, and the solution had been knowledge, self-discipline, and virtue,” Lewis writes. “For magic and [today’s] applied science alike the problem is how to subdue reality to the wishes of men: the solution is a technique; and both, in the practice of this technique, are ready to do things hitherto regarded as disgusting and impious…”

It reminded me of a section from Why Not Try Freedom by Leonard Read

Causes of Authoritarianism,

FAILURE: Inadequate Development of Self

Every individual is faced with the problem of whom to improve,

himself or others. The aim, it seems to me, should be to

effect one's own unfolding, the upgrading of one's own consciousness

- in short, self-perfection. Those who don't even try or, when

trying, find self-perfection too difficult, usually seek to expend

their energy on others. Their energy has to find some target.

Those who succeed in directing their energy inward - particularly

if they be blessed with great energy, like Goethe, for instance

- become moral leaders. Those who fail to direct their

energy inwardly and let it manifest itself externally - particularly

if they be of great energy, like Napoleon, for instance - become

immoral leaders. Those who refuse to rule themselves are usually

bent on ruling others. Those who can rule themselves usually

have no interest in ruling others.

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A.W. Carus's avatar

Your characterization of what you call "liberalism" or the "liberal" tradition is too generic; you name no names, other than Locke, and even there you go wrong: the first Treatise isn't an argument against patriarchy, it's an argument against Robert Filmer's analogy of political authority to parental (specifically fatherly) authority. Locke's argument against Filmer's analogy is absolutely not an argument against parental (or patriarchal) authority as such. And to imply that Locke was in any way, by some imagined extension, opposed to the authority of "reality" is also pretty misguided. Berkeley attacked him, after all, precisely for excessive attachment to reality and not taking his empiricism to the extreme idealism Berkeley arrived at. True, Locke was skeptical of science (though in later editions of the Essay he does allow that his friend Newton was onto something), and that skepticism does indeed appear to have been motivated by a kind of suspicion of authority. But a similar dialectic between exactly this sort of empiricist skepticism of authority (especially of ancient authorities such as Aristotle) and the creative impulse of coming up with theories to account for the evidence of "reality" plainly visible or measurable characterizes the whole modern development of science from Galileo through Huygens through Newton and beyond; even Einstein said he found the skeptical doubts of Ernst Mach toward the scientific tradition highly stimulating to his own thought process.

There is undoubtedly one thread in the whole complex and polyphonic history of liberalism that could be interpreted in a way that you want to attribute to the whole tradition, but that thread is a quite recent excrescence (and I think mostly an American one -- "liberalism" still means something quite different in America from what goes by that name in Europe, even including Britain). In pre-20th century liberalism, e.g. notably in Mill, but then even in Hayek, and certainly in both Nozick and Rawls, the responsibility component remains high-profile, and especially the responsibility to an agreed reality plays a central role.

So yes, the trends you observe are there, they are dire and threaten all civilization, and need to be understood. But I see the liberal tradition (apart from certain recent perverse outgrowths) as largely opposed to them.

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